好久沒有看純英文書了，這本書是託朋友購入已久。最近忙完個人進修課程後開始閱讀（相當好讀，我花六天就看完了）。
這本書沒有中譯本，但是網路上有PDF檔：http://www.mayers100x.com/100Baggers.pdf.
作者主要是講了一些過去50年來，成長了100倍的股票。雖然找到一隻Peter Lynch所謂的10 baggers是我的小小願望，但是我也抱著『得之•我幸；不得•我命』的態度，然自己對成長股情有獨鍾。也即使100 baggers是那麼的遙不可及，多看類似的書，或許也可以從裡面學到一些選股的技巧。
作者找出了從1962-2014成長了100倍的股票，一共有365隻，發現每個產業都有100 baggers。這是他做的一個統計：
有將近一半的股票，是花了16-30年才翻了100倍，在到達100倍的階段前，並不是年年都有漲幅。
作者以Monster Beverage為例，說明在成為翻了百倍的股票期間（只花了十年，請見上面表格），有幾年Monster Beverage的跌幅頗大（詳細數字可以看第184-185頁）作者告訴讀者，找到了一隻好股，就要有久抱的耐心。
以下是各章節的重點概念.
Chapter 1: Introducing 100-Baggers
Phelps advises looking for new methods, new materials and new products--things that improve life, that solve problems and allow us to do things better, faster and cheaper.
Relying only on published growth trends, profit margins and PE ratio is not as important as understanding how a company could create value in the years ahead.
Chapter 2: Anybody Can Do This: True Stories
就是告訴讀者找到100 bagger是有可能的
Chapter 3: The Coffee-Can Portfolio
The Lifespan of S&P 500
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2013/11/14/why-big-company-doesnt-mean-job-security/#b18bd9b79fb1
Chapter 4: Studies of 100-Baggers
作者訪問了一些投資者，而這些投資者列出了他們認為要變成100 baggers比較重要的元素:
Stocks traded for two times forward earnings （cheap!）.
Business was a cash cow with 70% gross margins. （基本上, 就是gross margin越高越好）
Earnings per share grew by a factor of 12.4x, how did the stock grow 100x? The answer lies in the price to earnings (P/E) multiple expansion. Investors in MTY went from paying roughly 3.5x earnings when it was left for dead in 2003 to a more optimistic 26x earnings in 2013.
You need huge growth in earnings. But the combination of rising earnings and a higher multiple on those earnings is really what drives explosive returns over the long-term.
....the single most important factor "is GROWTH in all its dimensions--sales, margin and valuation."
Studying 100-baggers, then, comes down to studying growth: How it happens. And how it endures--as it must to reach the heights of 100-baggerdom.
"Our analysis of the 100x stocks suggests that their essence lies in the alchemy of five elements forming the acronym SQGLP," they wrote:
S-Size is small.
Q-Quality if high for both business and management.
G-Growth in earnings is high.
L-Longevity in both Q and G.
P--Price is favorable for good returns.
"In the ultimate analysis, it is the management alone which is the 100x alchemist," they concluded. "And it is to those who have mastered the art of evaluating the alchemist that the stock market rewards with gold." Investing with top entrepreneurs and owner-operators gives you a big edge.
To make money in stocks you must have "the vision to see them, the courage to buy them and the patience to hold them." According to Phelps, "patience is the rarest of the three."
Conceptual power is more important. There is no amount of security analysis that is going to tell you a stock can be a 100-bagger. It takes vision and imagination and a forward-looking view into what a business can achieve and how big it can get. Investing is a reductionist art, and he who can boil things down to the essential wins.
Chapter 5: The 100 Baggers of the Last 50 Years
第5章是Case Studies. 下面僅列出Monster Beverage與Amazon的重點.
You have to train your mind to look for ideas that could be big, to think about the size of a company now versus what it could be. This doesn't mean you have to have a huge market to address, although that helps. Even a small company can become a 100-bagger by dominating a niche.
Despite occasional exceptions, you do want to focus on companies that have national or international markets.
從Monster Beverage學到的觀念（這篇case study頗值得一看的）
產品線, 品牌行銷, 通路的重要
"If you have a brand that catches on, grows, and hits scale, the costs start to slowly unwind."
"Monster shows us the power of high sales growth and building a brand and the potent mix of high sales growth and rising profits margins and rising return on equity.
從Amazon學到的觀念（這篇case study頗值得一看的）
Jeff Bezos本身是創辦人兼CEO
"He (Jeff Bezos) understands the value of a business is the sum of its future free cash flows, discounted back to the present. And he understands capital allocation and the importance of return on invested capital." （他在給股東的信裡有一再提到這個詞）
"Looking at Amazon's reported operating income, it doesn't look profitable," Thompson continues." "Adding back R&D, however, paints a completely different picture. In 2014, Amazon spent $9.2 million on R&D. Adding that back to operating income, Amazon generated adjusted operating income of $9.4 billion in 2014. That's an operating margin of 10.6%." "Very impressive. And what's even more impressive is how consistent this trend is." Adding back R&D sounds crazy, but the point is to think of R&D as an investment in this case. (There is a long history of debate in account circles about how to treat R&D. Should it be expensed against sales? Or should it be capitalized on the balance sheet like property and depreciated--or amortized---over time in bits?) "My higher level point is simply that Amazon could have been profitable if it wanted to," Thompson writes. "If it wanted to show earnings, it could have. It didn't. The layman who might be interested in buying Amazon stock would certainly be turned off by its lack of ever being profitable. Well, if you back out R&D--effectively backing out capex--you see how profitable it really has been." He recognizes to do this properly you'd want to amortize those R&D costs over some time period, the same way a firm would amortize costs spent on equipment.
So it would not have been easy to net a 100-bagger on Amazon. You would have to have had a strong conviction early that as an idea it would work. And you would have had to sit through a soul-crushing decline, where it lost more than 80% of its value. But you also would have had many chances to buy it at those low prices such that, while you might might not have netted a 100-bagger, you could easily have been up fiftyfold.
You have to have trusted Bezos, and you have to have been clued into this thinking. If he wanted to, Bezos could cut R&D expenses, and Amazon would gush cash. Instead, he invests the money and creates new growth.
Chapter 6: The Key to 100-Baggers
"Over time," Donville wrote, "the return of a stock and its ROE tend to coincide quite nicely."
When a company can build book value per share over time at a high clip, that means it has the power to invest at high rates of return.
Those stocks that are most attractive on a net-present-value basis are the ones that can grow at a higher rate. And to grow at an above-average rate, they have to have some kind of sustainable competitive advantage. These stocks generate high ROEs.
"If a company has a high ROE for four or five years in a row--and earned it not with leverage but from high profit margins--that's a great place to start."
"You could get a really good long run out of some of those quick-service restaurant ideas."
"If one of these guys has a bad quarter, the stock doesn't fall 35%. It falls 3% and then the ROE kicks in, and they are back to normal in no time."
Chapter 7: Owner-Operators: Skin in the Game
Bet with the people who have skin in the game (invest with people who own a lot of the stocks you're buying.) And as with value, an owner-operator is a predictor of future outperformance. "Owner-operators, over an extended period of time," Doyle said, "tend to outpace the broad stock market by a wide margin." 作者認為，若能找到一家企業，CEO本身就是創辦人，是最好不過的了.
Chapter 8: The Outsiders: the Best CEOs
CEOs should be good capital allocators, or good investors. CEOs have five basic options: investing in existing operations, acquire other businesses, pay dividends, pay down debt or buy back stocks.
"Over the long term, returns for shareholders will be determined largely by the decisions the CEO makes in choosing which tools to use."
Chapter 9: Secrets of an 18,000-Bagger
這篇主要在講Berkshire Hathaway，也提到Berkshire Hathaway其實是利用float來獲利的
Chapter 10: Kelly's Heroes: Bet Big
這篇的觀念其實之前在Concentrated Investing, The Winning Investment Habits of Warren Buffett & George Soros這兩本書就看過了（以後有空會寫一篇關於Kelly Criterion的感想以及運用方式）
Kelly Criterion主要的概念之一就是: keep the list of names relatively short. And focus on the best ideas. When you hit that 100-bagger, you want it to matter.
Chapter 11: Stock Buybacks: Accelerate Returns
When done right, buybacks can accelerate the compounding of returns. 作者提到股票回購的重要性，做得好的話，可加速投資的回報率.
Chapter 12: Keep Competitors Out
（這篇主要就是講護城河/競爭優勢的概念）
Since 100-baggers need time to ripen, Mauboussin's research indicates you may be better served in industries less susceptible to sweeping changes in the competitive landscape.
Berry writes that "high gross margins are the most important single factor of long run performance. The resilience of gross margins pegs companies to a level of performance. Scale and track record also stand out as useful indicators."
If gross margins are sticky and persistent, then a good turnaround candidate would be one with a high gross profit margin and a low operating margin. The latter is easier to fix than the former.
A track record of high performance is a useful indicator. Winners tend to remain winners. This makes sense, since high performance usually comes from some competitive advantage. And these advantages do not tend to "disappear overnight."
Chapter 15: 100-Baggers Distilled: Essential Principles
Akre looks for
businesses that have historically compounded value per share at very high rate
highly skilled managers who have a history of treating shareholders at though they are partners
business that can reinvest their free cash flow in a manner that continues to earn above-average returns（三者之中最重要的）
The essential principles of finding 100-baggers（100-baggers的要素）
You have to look for them
Growth, growth and more growth
Lower multiples preferred
Growth and lower multiples together get what I (the author) call the twin engines of a 100 bagger.
Economic moats are a necessity
Smaller companies preferred
Owner-operators preferred
You need time: use the coffee-can approach as a crutch （分散風險, 放著就不要常去看的概念）
You need a really good filter（要相信自己的判斷, 不要受到外界雜音的干擾）
Luck helps
You should be a reluctant seller
留言列表
